1. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines some issues arising out of the use of letters of intent in construction contracts.

Parties to construction contracts often (perhaps usually) resort to letters of intent for a number of reasons, including:

• anticipated delay in the preparation/agreement of the proposed construction contract;
• the Principal’s desire to urgently get the Contractor onto the site to commence work/order materials;
• the declining use of the letter of acceptance in favour of extensive negotiation with the successful tenderer.

The issues that arise out of the use of letters of intent include:

1. whether a contract has been formed;
2. whether an ancillary contract to perform the Works until a contract for the substantive part of the Works is formed upon the execution of a formal document by the parties;
3. the Contractor’s rights where the Principal ultimately declines to proceed with the project.

Other issues have arisen in this context such as, for example, whether the Principal’s consultants had authority, or ostensible authority, to enter into a contract on the Principal’s behalf. Such issues will depend on the particular circumstances and are beyond the scope of this paper. They impinge, however, on the letter of intent discussion and are therefore of some interest in that context.

It is not only in the area of construction contracts that letters of intent issues arise. Analogies (and guidance) can be derived from recent authorities in the following areas:-

• letters of comfort;
• intending joint venture agreements;
• promissory estoppel cases.

In this paper, I have attempted to bring some of these areas together to draw some general conclusions and to support the views expressed.

2. FORMATION OF CONTRACT

The principles affecting the formation (or not) of contracts where an offer or acceptance is said to be:

were set out extensively in Masters v Cameron.

The High Court identified three possible meanings of the phrase, the meaning to be adopted in each depending on the particular circumstances.

The words used by the parties, therefore, are never the sole consideration. The intention of the parties, as evidenced by the circumstances in each case, is the critical matter to be discerned by the Court.

The Courts in the United Kingdom have appeared to start from the premise that a "letter of intent" will usually not result in the formation of a contract.

In the British Steel case, the Principal wrote to the Contractor advising of its intention to enter into a supply contract and proposing a number of terms (at no stage ever agreed). The parties continued to send correspondence to each other asserting their respective preferred terms, but never achieving agreement. The Contractor completed the Contract. The Principal asserted that the Contractor was liable for damages for late delivery (the delivery schedule being one of the matters which had not been agreed).

The Court found:-

1. no contract had been formed;
2. the Contractor was entitled to recover on a quantum meruit (even though the Contract had been completed);
3. it was possible for a contract to be created by a letter of intent (though none had been created here).

In relation to whether a contract had been created, His Honour re-affirmed that:-

His Honour went on to distinguish two ways in which a letter of intent could result in a binding contract:-

1. an executory contract under which each party assumes reciprocal obligations to each other; or
2. an "if" contract, whereby one party promises to do something (for example, pay him) if the other party performs certain reciprocal obligations, and that other party in fact performs those reciprocal obligations (before the offer is withdrawn).

Courts in the USA have (equally) been less persuaded by the words used to describe the letter of intent, and more reliant on the particular facts.

For example, in Apco Amusement Company, Inc v Wilkins Family Restaurants of America, Inc the parties to a prospective lease entered into a document which provided, in part, as follows:

The letter was signed by both parties.

The Court of Appeals of Tennessee found that (the Court of first instance) was correct in finding that the letter constituted a binding agreement.

The Court spelt out the test as follows:

The Court was persuaded by a number of factors, in the Apco case, including:-

1. the parties acted on the letter as if it were binding;
2. the letter was worded much like a contract (it set out the respective obligations, and used words like "agrees", "accepts");
3. the party attempting to deny the contract had, in fact, prepared the wording.

• there will probably be a natural presumption that a letter of intent would not create a binding contract;
• the acts, circumstances and other factors surrounding the letter of intent are relevant as to whether, in the particular case, a contract has been formed.

The usual dispute which occurs is when a contractor starts work on the strength of a letter of intent and the Principal ultimately decides not to proceed with the project.

The Contractor has two immediate concerns:

1. to be paid for the work that he has already performed (there is a further issue as to whether the Contractor is to be paid at the Contract rates or on a quantum meruit);
2. to establish whether he has a remedy against the Principal for breach of contract.

In Turriff, the Contractor requested a letter of intent to "cover it" for design work under a proposed design and construction contract for extensions to a mill. The Principal wrote to the Contractor as follows:

The letter was signed by a director of the Principal.

Six months later, the project was cancelled and the Principal denied liability for the Contractor’s design work to that date.

Judge Fay found as follows:-

1. The parties had turned their minds to the obligation to pay for the design work at the time that the Contractor had requested, and been given, the letter of intent. As a result, the Contractor failed in its quasi-contract claim for a quantum meruit.
2. The parties had not achieved agreement on the formal (substantive) contract.
3. The pre-contract discussions, and the request for and the giving of the letter of intent resulted in the formation of an ancillary contract, for the interim work.

His Honour said:-

It is submitted that contractors will usually be able to recover payment for work performed pursuant to a letter of intent, either on a quantum meruit OR pursuant to an ancillary contract.

 4. LETTER OF COMFORT CASES

Two recent letter of comfort cases have possibly provided some further insight into how the Courts may choose to deal with letter of intent cases.

In Kleinwort Benson, a British financier lent 5 million pounds to a Malaysian mining company. The lender requested a letter of comfort from the borrower’s parent company. The parent wrote as follows:-

There was a subsequent liquidity crisis in the tin industry and the financier made a demand on the parent, based on the letter of comfort.

At first instance, Hirst J. found for the financier.. Importantly, Hirst J. was particularly persuaded by the events leading up to the preparation of the letter, and the obvious and strong reliance on that letter by the financier when advancing the funds.

The case was subsequently overturned on appeal. The Court of Appeal reasoned that:

• the statement as to "ensuring" the subsidiary’s ability to meet its obligations was cast in the present tense and did not constitute a promise to maintain that policy;
• there was no express promise to pay.

No doubt the case was correctly dealt with by the Court of Appeal. The critical consideration was the intention of the parties. Australian Courts, however, may be more attracted to the reasoning of Hirst J.

In Banque Brussels Lambert S.A. v Australian National Industries Ltd a recent decision of the Judge in Charge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Commercial Division, an Australian company (ANI) undertook not to dispose of its 45% shareholding in a subsidiary in consideration the lender making a US$5m advance to another subsidiary.

The letter of comfort had provided:-

In fact, in direct breach of the terms of the letter, the parent disposed of its shareholding, and the borrower went into liquidation. each of contract by the Principal when the proposed contract, the subject of the original tender, is later changed between the Principal and one or more short listed tenderers, after other tenderers have been excluded from the tender process.

In all such cases, the tenderers claim will be based in contract.