By the early 1980s the annual volume of wood extracted from the East Gippsland forests had reached record levels and could no longer be sustained (DCFL 1984, LCC 1985, Office of the Minister for Forests 1982). There had been no cut-backs, voluntary or forced, in the annual volume of wood extracted and no real discussion of a planned reduction in the cut, nor what a regional sustained yield would be. Decisions had not been taken, on which forests would ultimately be available for a sustainable local timber industry, or whether this would involve complete integrated sawlog-pulpwood harvesting, or how much of the forest would be required to meet growing demands from environmentalists.

A new Labor Government was elected in April 1982. By the summer of 1984 the Government was forced to deal with direct action by environmentalists when in January 1984 they organised a blockade of logging on the sensitive Errinundra Plateau in East Gippsland. While this forest blockade was brief, the new government's attempts to resolve the East Gippsland conflict were drawn out through a series of discursive designs on the forest problem where employment became the pivotal question.

The chronology of this chapter covers a four year period from the election of the Victorian Cain Labor Government in April 1982 to mid 1986. During this period the East Gippsland conflict developed under the new government and progressed from direct confrontation in the forests to a set of refined discursive designs, where the state attempted to throughly investigate, define and produce solutions to the forest problem. This chapter will trace the events, the conflicting discourses and the state's discursive designs. By mid 1986 the Government was in the final stages of preparing its Victorian Timber Industry Strategy, and was awaiting the Land Conservation Council's final recommendations on East Gippsland. These two documents would represent the `official state discourses' on the forests.

The chapter is organised into four sections: first, the immediate implications for the East Gippsland forest conflict of the election of the Cain Labor government are outlined; second, the threats of direct action, and the blockade of logging on the Errinundra Plateau by environmentalists and the counter-actions this provoked in the timber towns are documented; third, I return to the question of sustainability of wood production discussed in the previous chapter and look at renewed discourses produced by professional government foresters concerning resource estimates and production options, which in part set the terms to central debates and later conflicts. Finally, the government's responses to conflict, and the policy issues it faced, which took the form of a series of engineered investigative discursive designs, are outlined and examined.

The Australian Labor Party lead by John Cain, won office at the April 1982 state elections. As noted in the previous chapter, the ALP had made important pre-election commitments it would have to deal with now it was in office. In February 1982, the ALP platform was rewritten to include: opposition to woodchip schemes, the establishment of a public inquiry into all aspects of forestry in Victoria, and the creation of a new National park of real significance in East Gippsland.

The new Cain Government was committed and keen to embark on a major restructure of agencies, embracing the state's land use and natural resource management. By January 1984 the former Forest Commission had merged with the Department of Crown Lands and Survey and parts of the Ministry for Conservation (including the National Parks Service, Fisheries and Wildlife Service and the Soil Conservation Authority) to form the new `mega Department' of Conservation, Forest and Lands (DCFL). This bureaucratic restructure (the new Government argued) provided a more rational approach to natural resource management (Fitzgerald 1987:260). It was also hoped that this department would help contain, on an in-house basis, jurisdiction battles and recurring disputes between rival professional interests in the natural resource management field (Fitzgerald 1987:260-262).

Along with bureaucratic restructuring, the new Minister for Forests, Rod MacKenzie, took some early decisions concerning the timber industry. In the face of environmental protests he placed a moratorium on a licence for pulpwood harvesting in the Otways. This licence had been granted by the previous government just prior to the election and would have allowed Midway P/L a five year licence to commence and operate an export woodchip scheme from logging `waste'. The Minister established an inter-departmental inquiry to report on all aspects of the environmental and economic effects of pulpwood harvesting. He also cancelled the controversial trial pulpwood harvesting operation in East Gippsland prior to its first year of operation.

In August 1982, the Minister for Forests, instituted a new pre-logging planning procedure for logging zones or forest management blocks where less than 50% of the timber had been removed. The new procedure required a flora and fauna survey to be conducted by experts (botanists and wildlife biologists from the Arthur Rylah Institute conducted this survey work). These new arrangements represent another discursive design of government involving public participation in planning decisions. The results of the flora and fauna survey were transferred to forest maps, showing areas to be logged and areas to be preserved. The survey reports and the resulting maps were publicly released with a formal harvesting plan. Public comment was invited and a final harvesting plan adopted (DCFL 1984:126). The introduction of these surveys impacted on wood production forestry by identifing areas to be restricted from logging on environmental grounds. These information rich survey reports also provided another lever for environmental activists in their tactical battles over particular logging sites. They provided public information which was used in developing pro-environmental public discourses as was the case in the soon to be fought battles over the Rodger River and Errinundra Plateau forests.

The Government took no immediate action on its commitment to establish a public inquiry into the Victorian timber industry. This inquiry was being demanded by the Native Forest Action Council (NFAC) who believed, based on a meeting in June 1982 with the Minister for Conservation, that the Government was attempting a back-down on holding such an inquiry (NFAC, campaign notes:nd). On its commitment to establish a park of significance in East Gippsland, the new government was presented in August 1982 with new park proposals (illustrated in Map 7.1). These were an expanded form of the pre-election demands of the NFAC. This time they were being advocated by the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and promoted in a widely distributed four page pamphlet entitled East Gippsland Woodchipping (ACF 1982). As a comparsion of maps 6.2 and 7.1 show, these new park proposals demanded even larger forest conservation areas than the pre-election demands. They created additional pressure on the government over its commitment to a `park of real significance'. However, the size of these new park proposals were skillfully used by Government foresters to exert strategic counter-pressure on the Government itself. This discursive politics will be considered later in the chapter in the context of the development of wood resource estimates, production and sustainability options. Next, the impact of environmentalists' direct actions in the forests is examined.

By the use of direct action blockades environmentalists have been able, in some situations, to turn long running campaigns into front page political dramas. Two famous and successful cases were the seige of rainforest logging operations in the Terania Creek Basin in NSW 1979 (Taplin 1989) and the blockading of construction works related to the damming of the Franklin River in Tasmania in 1983 (Tighe 1989). This form of direct protest in the forests and wilderness areas drew the media, who offered extensive and often dramatic coverage. One important effect of these direct actions was that they commanded an immediate political response from government. In the summer of 1983-1984 a dramatic blockade of logging operations was staged on the Errinundra Plateau in East Gippsland. This section briefly documents the blockade, its immediate aftermath and the counter-movements it provoked.

The prelude to the Errinundra forest blockade was the battle for the Rodger River area, which contained 1.3 million potential sawlogs and was excluded from logging by the Griffen-Brown line. By the late 1970's sawmillers were pressing for permission to log the Rodger River's mature and largely defectless trees. By 1980 all high quality sawlog areas in East Gippsland had been included in forward logging plans (Geary per comm 1993). Environmental organisations were alerted by the release in June 1983 of the Rodger River harvesting proposal. This proposal contained the first flora and fauna survey, which concluded that of the 1.3 million m3 sawlogs available, 80% could be made available for logging, while the remaining 20% should be withheld pending further ecological assessment. This finding was of concern to environmental organisations which after the release of the harvesting proposal begun to campaign for the total preservation of the Rodger River forests and threatened the Government with direct protest actions if logging proceeded (NFAC, campaign notes, ND). In November 1983 the local based Concerned Citizens of East Gippsland sited their annual Forest Forever Camp in the heart of the Rodger River area (CROEG 1984:1).

The Government, mindful of the recent Franklin River Dam controversy was extremely sensitive. On December 1 1983, the Minister for Conservation, Forests and Lands, Rod Mackenzie, announced that he had ordered a `comprehensive inquiry into the timber industry'. In a further move designed to prevent any direct action campaign in the Rodger River, he announced a two year moratorium on any logging of the area "pending the outcome of the inquiry" (Mackenzie 1983). This announcement was a victory for environment groups in their campaign over East Gippsland. Environmental activists had effectively exercised power. Their tactical threat of direct action had forced the Government to commence its promised inquiry into the timber industry and had halted the logging of the Rodger River. Environmental activists now turned their attention to the Errinundra Plateau.

Logging on the Errinundra Plateau had commenced in 1967 and by 1983 the area was producing annually 30,000 m3 sawlogs. Detailed logging plans for the 1983-1984 season, including the West Errinundra area, were made available for public review and according to Joiner (nd:18), no comment was received by the Minister's office. The actual site of the proposed logging for the 1983-1984 season was an area known as Compartment No 3 (a subsection of the West Errinundra management block) and during 1983 about 1 km of logging road had been constructed to further open Compartment No 3 for logging.

It was on this new logging road that protestors in early January 1984 established a camp style blockade, with the intention of halting all logging in that area. But who were these protestors? The camp was not established by either the local environmental group CROEG or any of the peak environmental groups based in Melbourne but by a group of people known as the Nomadic Action Group (NAG), later to call themselves the Forest People. The advisor to the Minister for Conservation, Forests and Lands described this group as:

It appears that the people forming NAG were attracted to East Gippsland by news of an impending forest protest over the Rodger River. It is claimed (Joiner nd:5) that NAG had made no direct contact with any of the peak environmental groups. NAG used information obtained from recent research by the botanist David Cameron (employed by the Forest Commission). Cameron had recently produced a detailed report on the ecological significance of the Errinundra Plateau and was on-site during the forest blockade (Johnson 1993: per comm). When confronted by the Government's representatives on-site, NAG made much use of Cameron's reports in their demands for an indefinite halt to any logging on the Errinundra Plateau.

The blockade had for two weeks prevented logging contractors from entering Compartment No 3 and a tense and aggressive mood quickly developed. Peak environment groups held a press conference disassociating themselves from the actions of NAG. This was in the belief that governments by this time had become frustrated with such actions, and the groups needed to protect their relationship with the Cain government (Durkin 1993: per comm). Forestry personnel and local police had no success in talking the protesters into removing the blockade. The Minister, Rod Mackenzie and his advisors landed on the Plateau by helicopter on 13 January 1984. NAG's initial demand was that all logging on the Plateau cease, however during a meeting between the protesters and the Minister, NAG (now called the Forest People) tabled a written set of demands:

Within days the Minister and his advisors decided there was little chance of ending the blockade which was becoming more heated. Representatives of the local timber industry demanded the Minister take a stand and clear the blockade. On the 17th of January 1984 the Minister announced that all logging operations would proceed as planned for the next three years. However, how to clear the blockade? This required the Minister with Cabinet approval, to draft new and specific regulations under section 99(33) of the Forest Act, used in conjunction with the Summary Offences Act. Within days an authorised officer advised the forest protesters that they would be arrested if they did not leave the site of their blockade. The protestors resisted and police were called; 20 were arrested and charged in Orbost. The blockade which had lasted three weeks was over.

By the 24th of January 1984, David Cameron had prepared and circulated a seven page letter detailing the ecological features of the Errinundra Plateau (Cameron 1984). This letter called for support to pressure the Government to redirect logging operations away from sensitive ecological areas on the Plateau and to immediately have the LCC conduct a land-use review of East Gippsland (Cameron 1984). On the 25th of February 1984 the Age newspaper carried the Errinundra Declaration, a statement signed by nearly 400 Australian and overseas experts. The Errinundra Declaration read:

This Declaration provided a basis on which the Government could negotiate and a series of meetings were held with peak environmental groups (representatives from NFAC, ACF, Conservation Council of Victoria attended) (Joiner nd:10). The major issue to emerge was how to identify and protect sensitive areas prior to logging plans being implemented. The Minister's response was to establish the Cutting Areas Review Committee (CARC) in April 1984. The purpose of the CARC was "...to assess all proposed cutting areas, in advance, to ensure that sensitive areas are identified and protected at the same time as ensuring that sawlog allocations are satisfied" (Mackenzie 1984).

The CARC was initially composed of members from various divisions of the new Department. It provided imput from experts from Fisheries and Wildlife and the National Parks Service on the location of logging operations. By September 1984 CARC had approved an amended harvesting plan for the Errinundra Plateau, identifying areas to be excluded from logging pending the LCC review of East Gippsland (CARC 1984). However, the extent of the area excluded was criticised by the NFAC in letters to Cabinet members and ALP backbenchers demanding an immediate halt to all logging on the Plateau. Despite these demands logging under the amended proposal of CARC proceeded. The Minister cited pressing sawlog demands, potential temporary loss of employment and the inter-disciplinary nature of CARC's advice to justify the logging plan (Mackenzie 1984).

Unlike the case of the Rodger River logging moratorium, here the protests from an environmental organisation had failed, its attempt to exercise power to stop logging on the Errinundra Plateau was not achieved. However, the Minister was forced to seek further legitimation for logging programs and in early 1985 CARC was expanded to include a representative nominated from the Victorian Sawmillers Association (VSA) and one nominated by the environment groups who had participated in the meetings with the Minister after the publication of the Errinundra Declaration (discussed above). This action represented the formation of a corporatist style arrangement and is an example of social movement incorporation in mechanisms of government. In subsequent reviews of forward logging plans for the 1985/1986 logging season, it is alleged by industry that the environment group representative on CARC objected to numerous proposed logging areas. This created delays in the final approvals and created problems for sawmillers in obtaining logs (VSA 1986). For environmental activists CARC, like the flora and fauna studies, became another discursive mechanism in which detailed information from the Government became available and which was useful in public campaigns over particular logging sites.

The advent of forest blockades in conflicts over forest and wilderness areas had provided the environment movement with the opportunity to transfer "...their city resources - their political and media contacts, their researched arguments, their articulate presentation - into the rustic setting of the bush" (Watson 1990:89). Taking direct action was an important addition to the repertoire of political action available to environmentalists. It had important impacts in the social construction of protest, social movement mobilisation, and in eliciting responses from government. It extended the movements ability to exercise power and effect change. But as Foucault has said, where there is power there is resistance. And the advent of direct action by environmental activists was to generate counter protests and provide the spark for counter-movement organising.

In East Gippsland, not long after the Errinundra Plateau blockade, forces in the East Gippsland area made up of timber companies, the Orbost Shire Council and the Orbost Chamber of Commerce mounted a large counter rally in March 1984. This rally was held at the Orbost showgrounds and was attended by an estimated 2000 people. This lead to the formation of a community based counter-movement ranged against environmentalists and with resources to counter lobby the Government. In close cooperation with the timber industry which provided research and publishing back-up, a counter-movement organisation based on local governments calling itself the Timber Towns Association (TTA) was established on a state-wide basis. A Timber Towns Symposium was held in Sale on the 15th November 1984. Bringing together representatives of 40 local government councils and timber industry people, the symposium contained speeches notable for their emotive vitriol against environmentalists. For example:

Not long after this symposium, it was impossible to drive the Princess Highway without encountering trucks displaying large signs reading `Save Our Timber Towns'. Car stickers appeared throughout Victoria reading `Be a Conservationist Bury a Greenie'. Even 18 months after the Errinundra blockade the newsagent in Orbost was still selling stickers reading `Give AIDS to Greenies'. For all the direct protest actions, a tactic that would continue to be used in the ongoing conflict, the contending forces were to be progressively drawn into the web of discursive designs engineered by the government. However, before looking at these discursive designs, I return to the question of the sustainability of wood production which was introduced in the previous chapter. The next section examines discourses on resource estimates and wood production options produced by government foresters for the new Labor Government. It was these discourses which critically shaped later discursive struggles, especially over the question of forest employment.

In the previous chapter, it was noted how the Forest Commission's wood production strategies and their prospects of achievement depended on resource estimates. In the East Gippsland case, without the introduction of logging in forests that were regarded by convention as uneconomic for sawlogs-only the resource estimates would not hold up, forcing major cut-backs in the sawmilling industry if not complete closure. This section returns to the issue of the sustainability of wood production, examining two documents concerning resource estimates and wood production options developed for the Labor government by government foresters. Although both these documents were made available to the public on completion, their production reflects what Foucault suggests is an unequal distribution of power. Here, government foresters had "licit and immediate access to a corpus of already formulated statements" (Foucault 1972:68) enabling them and no others to draw on existing government data.

In July 1982, the new Minister for Forests called for new estimates of timber resources and wood production options for the state. This work was carried out by a special Task Force consisting of senior government forestry bureaucrats from the Forest Commission. By this time, with the experience of the 1970s in particular the LCC processes, and the new government's move against export woodchipping schemes, professional government foresters had realised the politics involved in resource estimation and were aware they needed to be more politically effective (Wareing 1993: per comm). The Minister's call for new resource estimates and options provided them with a political opportunity to construct a report based on their own agenda. This Task Force reported in September 1982, producing the document Options for Future Wood Production in Victoria: Report to the Minister for Forests (Office of the Minister of Forests 1982).

The Task Force developed options within the context of the Labor Government's concern about the employment question involved in forest conflict and policy making. The Task Force also operated within the sensitive political question; of whether some form of integrated harvesting (harvesting pulplogs with sawlogs) would be introduced in forests where it was currently not permitted (chiefly in the Forest Commission's `Eastern Division', see Map 6.1). This provided the opportunity to illustrate the volumes of timber available on a sawlog-only harvesting basis, compared to the volumes available if wood production was conducted in accord with the Forest Commission's agenda, on an integrated basis (harvesting pulpwood with sawlogs). In addition, the Task Force skillfully used key environmental demands to illustrate the dramatic effect they would have on both sawlog and pulpwood availability, if accepted by the government. They factored into their estimates and options the ACF's 1982 park proposals for both the East Gippsland and the Alpine areas, and the demand that logging rotations be at least doubled, from 80-120 years to 200 plus.

In the context of these broad questions, the Task Force framed four options in terms of resource impacts on industry from: (1) full sawlog - pulpwood harvesting with no additional national parks; (2) current sawlog harvesting, present pulpwood restrictions retained and no additional parks; (3) current sawlog harvesting, present pulpwood restrictions and the ACF's new parks accepted; (4) option 3 above, but conducted under extended harvesting rotations (double current practice).

The Task Force produced graphs on a state wide basis for each of the options it had devised (these are shown in a compilation graph in Figure 7.1). The graph shows dramatic differences in timber availability resulting from the policy choices implied in the graphs. However, the Task Force did not break this picture up by regions. In the context of the Forest Commission's historical policy of over-cutting in various forest locations to compensate for the loss of the Central Highlands in the 1939 fires (see chapter five), the omisssion of regional profiles masked the skewed nature of resource flows and the various sustainability issues across the state.

The Task Force presented a statewide picture indicating a relatively small decline in sawlog availability based on no new national parks and full sawlog-pulpwood harvesting in all regions of the state, which was the Forest Commission's historical intent (see line 1 in figure 7.1). Hidden from this picture were the quite massive declines in resource availability soon to occur in various regions, particularly in East Gippsland, as a result of regional over-cutting. These resource impacts would come to public attention and considerable discursive conflict in later documents and inquiries.

The Forest Commission's historical policy of regional over-cutting was to have immense ecological, industrial, and social effects, especially in its `Eastern Division' (see Map 6.1). And given the size of the East Gippsland resource and its pivotal influence on possible changes in total State wide resource availability, it is remarkable that the Task Force did not, nor was it directed to, produce similiar graphs showing the East Gippsland picture under the various combinations of policy questions facing the government.

Indeed, the Task Force report offered a very incomplete and inaccurate picture of the inevitable and substantial decline in sawlog production in East Gippsland. As noted in Chapter Six this was going to be the result of traditional policy objective of over-cutting the mature/over-mature forests in its `Eastern Division' (see Map 6.1) until such time as 1939 ash regrowth could support a relocated timber industry. On the implications of over-cutting the `Eastern Division', the Task Force offered a general comment. This was inserted earlier in the text and not connected to the presentation of Statewide options. It was claimed that as part of the future industry relocation as regrowth in the Central Highland become available, in the `Eastern Division' "...the annual log output is expected to fall by 76,000 m3, equivalent to the log intake of six average sawmills in that area" (Office of the Minister for Forests 1982). This was estimated to result in the loss of 160 jobs between 1982 and 1992 (Office of the Minister for Forests 1982:23).

This limited picture does not correspond statistically with the Forest Commission's data base at the time. I have already noted (Chapter Six) that after the LCC's review (1974-1977) the Forest Commission regarded that in East Gippsland over-cutting could be maintained until 2002 after which there would be a 40 % cut-back. Further, it was on the basis of the same data base that the LCC argued, three years later, that if the present level of sawlog harvesting continued in East Gippsland, the mature/over-mature resource would be exhausted within 19-25 years leaving a resource gap of between 20 and 30 years until regrowth within the region would become available for wood production (LCC 1985:23). As this chapter proceeds we will see just how inaccurate the Task Force was in its limited resource and employment forecasts for East Gippsland.

The lack of any real indication of impending and quite sudden declines in sawlogs within various regions needs to be compared with what the Task Force said in various parts of its text on the resource implications for East Gippsland, of options it attempted to place in front of the Government. It is important to note in their report when talking of `East Gippsland', the reference is to the Forest Commission's `Eastern Division' (see Map 6.1). Within its text the Task Force suggested if regional sustainable yields were immediately adopted in the Eastern Division the present allocated sawlog volume of 540 000 m3/yr would reduce to 300 000 m3/ya, but a pulpwood production of 800 000 m3/yr could be sustained. If current National Park proposals for East Gippsland were accepted, current production of sawlogs of 540 000 m3/ya would reduce to 150 000 m3/ya. Such a reduction would result in the loss of 800 jobs, and the potential pulpwood production of 800 000 m3/ya would reduce to 300 000 m3/ya. If extended rotations were introduced, along with the new National parks plus no logging in Melbourne's water catchments, the Statewide sawlog availablity would fall immediately, from 1 200 000 m3/ya to 370 000 m3/ya and reduce to 100 000 m3/ya by 2000. Statewide pulpwood commitments could not be supplied (Office of the Minister for Forests 1982:122-127).

It is reasonable to conclude that the Task Force had shaped its report in a particular and selective way. It had focussed on the dramatic impacts on industry from accepting environmental claims. At the same time it gave little and somewhat misleading attention to the regional impacts of existing production policies. However two years after it had reported, another set of options were produced in the new Department of Conservation, Forests and Land's (DCFL) submission to the Timber Industry Inquiry, Submission to the Timber Industry Inquiry (DCFL August 1984). These new options were developed by the same government foresters who had worked on the earlier Task Force, but by this time, as we will see, the policy context had changed. This time, quite clear and detailed regional profiles were presented, including regional graphs of new resource options and associated employment impacts. Yet once again the formulation and structuring of these profiles represented the exclusive,`licit and immediate access' of one group to Government data and statements. More critically, these new profiles represent an important `discursive event' within the East Gippsland conflict, for as is shown below, the options devised for East Gippsland and the consequent shape of resource and employment impacts (in graph form) centrally determined the core of subsequent discursive conflict contained in both the Ferguson Timber Industry Inquiry and the second LCC review of East Gippsland.

However before examining these new estimates and options, it is important to note that in this submission, as in the 1982 Task Force report, no mention was made of the operational definition that divided the forests of East Gippsland into economic on a sawlog-only basis, and uneconomic for sawlogs without pulpwood removal. As noted in the previous chapter, this operational definition was the result of the historical convention between sawmillers and the Forest Commission where forests stands carrying 40 m3 per hectre of sawlogs were regarded as economic to harvest on a sawlog-only basis, while leaving pulpwood on the forest floor, while forest stands carrying below 40 m3 per hectre were regarded as uneconomic to harvest for sawlogs without taking the pulpwood. The implications of this operational convention on resource availability and policy decisions, and in setting paramaters to subsequent discursive conflict, will become more clear in the remaining part of this dissertation

As mentioned above, the 1984 DCFL submission was prepared in a new policy context. First, the terms of reference of the Board of Inquiry into the Timber Industry had been released. This involved the development of options for a long-term strategy for the timber and forest products industries. These options were to be developed within the Government's policy context of moving to regional sustainable yields and "the need to minimise any adverse effect in the industry on employment and on the stability of dependant communities" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:2). Another term of reference, critically relevant to the East Gippsland situation, was for the Inquiry to investigate and report on "the economic and environmental effects of current and proposed pulpwood harvesting schemes" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:3). However, the inquiry was explicitly precluded from reviewing or commenting on land use decisions, especially national park claims. Second, these new options were developed in the context of the restructuring of regional forest management. By 1984 the former Forest Commission's `Eastern Division' had been divided into two distinct regions, East Gippsland and Far East Gippsland; and the latter region accords with the study area of this dissertation (see Map 1.1).

In its submission the DCFL produced graphs on a regional basis showing sawlog availability under various options. In the case of the graph for Far East Gippsland, reproduced here in Figure 7.2, the options developed were:

On the basis of the employment impacts of the devised options, the DCFL suggested that option 2 (immediate introduction of sustained yield based on current sawlog practice with extended integrated harvesting) "...appears to provide for the least disruption to employment, now and in the future" (DCFL 1984:170). Despite this suggestion, in the conclusion to the submission the preferred strategy advocated by the DCFL equates with option 1a in Figure 7.2, which defers the introduction of a sustained yield until 1995. If pulpwood harvesting was not introduced, DCFL was predicting 420 jobs would be lost in 1995. However, the DCFL supported this option with the following discourse:

This discourse supports the continuance of the over-cutting strategy for East Gippsland. The significance of this discourse

and the associated preferred option of 1a in Figure 7.2 was in setting a framework of policy questions. The nature and shape of options 1a and 1b and the associated graphs (see Figure 7.2) produced by DCFL are replicated and subsequently refined and partially realigned within the discursive designs established by the government and these are considered in the next section. As the last part of this chapter demonstrates, these discursive designs along with much of the surrounding discursive conflict, would deal with the employment impacts of policy questions associated directly with: how large would new National Parks be, how and when to move to a regional sustained yield, and, whether to introduce pulpwood harvesting and under what conditions. In all these policy areas, estimates of resource availability and associated employment impacts were to be crucial.

The remaining section of this chapter will outline and examine selected aspects of the discursive designs the Government engineered in order to investigate and find solutions to the forest problem. These designs involved an Inquiry into the Victorian timber industry and a second Lands Conservation Council review of East Gippsland land-use. This section involves a consideration of the rival discourses these designs generated. Much of the discussion will centre around the question of employment, where there were counter claims over reasons for predicted and often dramatic changes in employment levels in the East Gippsland timber industry.

The Cain government announced on 1 December 1983 that it would proceed with a public inquiry into the Victorian timber industry and that it had placed a two year moritorium on logging the Rodger River area. By May 1984 the terms of reference had been announced for a one-person Board of Inquiry, chaired by Ian Ferguson, Professor of Forest Science at the University of Melbourne. The inquiry was be open to extensive public participation. The procedures adopted included: calling for submissions (nearly 500 submissions were received), public hearings, field inspections, commissioning of specialist reports, public release of hearing transcripts and submissions, and a second round of public hearings where participants were given the opportunity to comment on transcript evidence and the submissions of others. The terms of reference of the inquiry were outlined in the previous section. Ferguson reported to the government in two lengthy volumes in June 1985. Here I consider Ferguson's investigation and findings on the East Gippsland region, in particular his treatment of the issues of sawlog availability, sustained yield, pulpwood harvesting and employment.

It was the submission to the Inquiry from the DCFL (discussed in the previous section), which set the real context for Ferguson's investigation and findings on East Gippsland. The Department's crucial discourse to the inquiry works within the Government's policy aim of moving to regional sustainable yields. However it does this by skillfully marrying that policy aim with two of its own goals. These are first; its long-term plan to relocate the sawmilling industry into the Central Highlands' ash regrowth (the result of the 1939 bushfires). This, as I have shown, was based on regional over-cutting and perhaps is the reason the Department pushed for a ten year delay to introduce sustained yield in East Gippsland. Second, it was the Department's policy aim since the late 1960s to introduce pulpwood harvesting into East Gippsland. These two goals were interlocked by the Department because of the government's concern with minimising any sudden employment disruptions, one of the key settings given to the Ferguson inquiry.

Along with the above discourse, Ferguson's investigation of East Gippsland starts with the options and resource forecasts presented by the DCFL to the inquiry. His focus was on the DCFL graph (see Figure 7.2), in particular the nature and shape of options 1a and 1b. Ferguson begins by presenting his version of this graph showing a forecast of sawlog availability for Far East Gippsland. Ferguson's graph is basically a replication of the DCFL option 1b and is reproduced here in Figure 7.3, which as Ferguson noted, is "...based on the assumption that the present system of cutting will continue" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:116). However in his graph Ferguson brings to light the difference between the supply commitment for sawlogs of 390 000 m3/ya and an average level of sales between 1979 and 1984 of 320 000 m3/ya (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:319).

Ferguson then attempted a reading of the DCFL graph (see Figure 7.2). In his prefacing remarks he states "The Department of Conservation, Forest and Lands believes that cutting cannot be continued at the current levels of commitment" and goes further stating that the Department advocates two options "...either (1) an immediate reduction to about 150 000 m3/pa or (2) maintenance of the present cut until 1995, followed by a reduction to 100 000 m3/pa" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:320). Having put into words the implications of the DCFL options, Ferguson raises two questions; the traditional division of the forests into economic/uneconomic for sawlog only production and, future changes in sawlog utilisation standards:

This discourse of Ferguson is historically significant. It is the first public discussion of the operating convention which divides the forests on economic criteria. Ferguson presents a challenge to the basis of this convention and the consequent division of the production forests in East Gippsland by the industry and Government foresters. Ferguson's argument is that changing economic circumstances will mean the majority of sawlogs in so-called uneconomic forests will be recovered without the need to introduce pulpwood harvesting. Further, Ferguson adds that changing utilisation standards for sawlogs will in the future mean a marginal increase in the amount of sawlogs recovered in logging operations. Although Ferguson predicts only a small net increase, he is the first in the debate to raise the question of possible changes to what could be regarded as a sawlog. Ferguson's forecast that an additional 5% of logging material will in time be considered as logs for sawmilling; as I demonstrate later in this dissertation, is rather modest.

Ferguson's analysis of the nature and basis of Government estimates of the timber resource in East Gippsland represents an interesting instance of discursive change in a discourse central to a sustainable regional industry. With this `discursive event' Ferguson had not only placed the basis of the Government's resource estimates before the public, but his analysis had critically re-aligned this discourse with the addition of a challenge to the basis of the economics of the convention which had divided the production forests, and by opening up the question of change to what was regarded as a sawlog. These issues, and further discursive changes within the discourse on sustainability of wood production will be discussed later.

The net effect of Ferguson's resource forecasts was to increase the volume of sawlog availability under either options 1a, 1b and 3 in the DCFL submission to the inquiry (see Figure 7.2). On the question of current National park proposals, Ferguson simply adopts the DCFL forecasts of sawlog loss of 60 000 m3 pa (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:320). Ferguson regards this as "...a worst case scenerio for the timber industry" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:320). In contrast to the DCLF employment forecasts under its sawlog options (see Table 7.1), Ferguson produced without any clear reasoning in the inquiry report, employment impacts for his preferred option (to be cited below) for the sawlog cut. On the basis of his preferred option, Ferguson suggested a small loss of 30 jobs during the decade 1985-1995 compared with DCFL's forecast of 250 to 460 lost jobs, based on the DCFL options 2 and 4 respectively (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:335). The figure of 460 lost jobs is based on the assumption of acceptance of the then current National park proposals. This is not included in Ferguson's employment forecasts, so the comparsion is really between 250 (DCFL) and 30 jobs lost (Ferguson).

Ferguson then proceeds to summarise the major options for the sawlog cut, reproduced here in the lower part of Figure 7.3. Of these options, Ferguson says he is "profoundly sceptical about both" and suggests that "gains in social net benefits from either of these options are not clear" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:322). However he does comment that the "...adherence to the sustained yield model has led the Department to advocate options which are not in the best interests of Victoria and especially of the residents of Far East Gippsland" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:323). Ferguson's preferred option involves reducing the cut to the average of sales between 1979-1984 and the cancellation of `subject to availability licences' (20 000 m3 pa). This gives a starting point of 306 500 m3 pa. From this point he advocates his own preferred option which involves using a lottery device at ten year intervals to effect any required additional reduction:

On the question of pulpwood harvesting, Ferguson argues strongly that the net social gains far outweigh the limited additional environmental impact. However, he argued that "...rampant clearfelling must not be permitted" and that pulpwood production must be "tied to sawlog harvesting requirements" (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:xxiv-xxv). Further, he argued that the introduction of pulpwood harvesting should be preceeded by an environmental effects statement with extensive public participation (Ferguson 1985, vol 1:251). The other major recommendation of Ferguson which impacts on East Gippsland, was his advocacy for long-term and legislated log licences.

In his concluding comment on East Gippsland, Ferguson argued:

Ferguson had produced a major official discourse on the forests. In the next section I examine the Government's response and criticisms from the major forces in the East Gippsland conflict.

At the official release of the Timber Industry Inquiry report, 25 July 1985, the new Minister for Conservation, Forests and Lands, Joan Kirner, issued a brief document titled The Ferguson Report: Government Response (Victorian Government 1985). This document stated:

The Government rejected Ferguson's lottery device for reducing the sawlog cut in East Gippsland and called for public comments in response to the Inquiry report. It also announced the preparation of a Timber Industry Strategy. The timber industry published its response The Timber Industry in Victoria: An Economic Necessity (TITF, Sept 1985); presented as a strategy aimed at growth in the industry, in particular the prospect of developing industries based on the unused pulpwood resource. This document strongly endorsed Ferguson's positive recommendation on pulpwood harvesting. However, it stated:

Here the industry drew on the `waste' discourse and the economic loss of any further delays with introducing pulpwood harvesting, fearing a lengthy environmental effects statement process.

The peak environment groups, which at this time operated under the title of the `Joint Conservation Groups' (JCG), responded with a 70 page document (plus a 26 page summary/index) titled Joint Conservation Groups: Comments on the Board of Inquiry into the Timber Industry (JCG, Sept 1985). Soon after, the JCG formed the East Gippsland Coalition (EGC) (Australian Conservation Foundation, Conservation Council of Victoria, Native Forests Action Council, Wilderness Society, Victorian National Parks Association). The Coalition soon released the first in a series of widely circulated briefing papers titled Summary of the Group's Response to the Timber Industry Inquiry (EGCa, Nov 1985). In these two documents the environment movement claimed Ferguson had failed to deliver a sound critique of the existing timber industry, had neglected issues concerning the long-term management of public forests and had simply provided a strategy biased toward the position of the timber industry (EGC 1985:1). The most prominant issues in the EGC's response to Ferguson's findings were the questions of clearfelling and pulpwood production. On clearfelling (a silvicultural method of logging and regenerating forests), the EGC claimed:

A further link between clearfelling and pulpwood harvesting (called woodchipping) was made, and this is central to the environment movement's discourse on woodchipping:

The environment movement's response to Ferguson's findings on pulpwood harvesting was to suggest:

For the Government, the Ferguson inquiry provided an analysis of the timber industry and a basis for its development of an industry strategy. However, the Government also needed an independent land-use review of East Gippsland to accommodate conservation claims. This was to come with the second LCC review and while the major forces expended effort in their critiques of the Ferguson inquiry report, they also turned their attention to producing new submissions and increasing their lobbying in response to the commencement of the LCC's East Gippsland land-use review. It is this review and the major discursive conflicts involved which is next considered.

The new Labor Government appointed David Scott as Chairman of the LCC. Scott, the former head of the Brotherhood of St Lawrence, brought to the position a radical church social justice background. He had to address the Government's commitment to a new park of significance in a climate where new parks were regarded by many as a recipe for job destruction. His approach included, commissioning the National Institute of Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR) to conduct a series of studies on the economic and employment implications of land-use policy decisions and, to act as a specialist and so-called independent impact assessor of the LCC's recommendations. Below I consider the major issues and themes to emerge in the LCC's review, the increasing political campaigns of the protaganists and the LCC's proposed recommendations and their assessment by NIEIR.

The LCC released its descriptive report on East Gippsland in June 1985 and invited public comment on land-use questions. By August 1985 the first NIEIR study report was available, which attempted to provide "...a socio-economic base or profile of the area, particularly related to use of resources on public land" (NIEIR 1985:1) against which the LCC could consider the land use issues and make recommendations. The study found there were 636 jobs in the local timber industry directly related to wood processing from public forests. This accounted for 42 % of the full-time workforce in East Gippsland (statistically corresponding to the Shire of Orbost) (NIEIR 1985:52-53).

In response to the LCC's descriptive report, the newly formed East Gippsland Coalition (EGC) released its park proposals in Greenprint for the Forests (EGC 1985) reproduced here in Map 7.2. These new park proposals were not as extensive as the 1982 ACF proposals, covering about one half of the former demands used in the resource options, discussed in the previous section of this chapter.

The DCFL's position was to recommend to the LCC some significant new National parks, but these were far smaller in area than demanded by the EGC. DCFL's regional administration made the point that if the ECG park proposals were adopted, there would be "little chance of a sustainable cut" and argued that "...the National Park Service's `compromise' option and the East Gippsland Coalition proposals are further steps to removing the industry entirely" (DCFL 1985a:4). The DCFL's submission argued strongly for the introduction of integrated sawlog/pulpwood production, stating:

The revised size of the ECG's park demands was taken up in a pro-environmentist's submission to the LCC from the Ministry of Planning and Environment (MPE). This submission was prepared by Ross Scott, who had previously taken six months' leave from the Public Service to fight the Franklin River campaign. The argument advanced in this submission was that the estimated 60 000 m3 pa loss of sawlogs from the EGC's park proposals was minor when compared to losses needed to achieve a regional sustainable yield. Using the DCFL options graph (see Figure 7.2), it was argued that the resource losses to achieve a sustained yield, were in the order of 220 000 m3 pa or 180 000 m3 pa with extended pulp production (MPE 1985:29-30).

In another section of the MPE submission, sub-titled `The Hidden Sawlog Resource', an elaborate case is advanced concerning the exact volume of sawlogs available to the industry. This was based on an interesting interpretation of a range of estimates to argue that there is between 10.5 and 11.5 million m3 sawlogs and not the 6.8 million m3 as suggested in the LLC's 1985 descriptive report. Of note here is the contradiction in MPE's argument that 2.8 million m3 of their suggested sawlogs could be obtained from forest areas currently considered uneconomic for sawlogs without pulpwood production, for elsewhere in their submission it was advocated that no logging be permitted in these areas for conservation reasons. Nowhere in the MPE submission is any estimate given of employment impacts. The logic was simply to use the inflated estimates of total sawlog volume, then divide this by a per annum figure of between 260 500 - 275 850 m. This exercise produced the following conclusion:

By implication, in MPE's view of the resource base, there would be minimal employment losses. The MPE then presents another contradiction, suggesting that an immediate move to a sustained yield involves a reduction of 220 000 m3 pa and that this is 3.6 times the impact, compared to the impact of park proposals (being the 1982 ACF proposals which were larger than the ECG's 1985 proposals). The contradiction is that a sustained yield based on MPE's hidden sawlog resource would involve a reduction from 260 000 m3 pa to 190 000 m3 pa, at the very worst. Clearly a reduction of 70 000 m3 pa for a sustained yield is not then 3.6 times the impact of a 60 000 m3 pa reduction for new parks. This mistake would appear to flow from an over zealous concern to firstly, find more sawlogs; and second, to shift the blame for employment losses, to the need to reach a sustained yield and minimise the potential impact of proposed new parks.

The EGC, along with its advocacy of the park proposals before the LCC, maintained its campaign against woodchipping in East Gippsland. In support of its position the EGC released a widely circulated briefing paper titled Woodchipping (EGC 1986) and organised a large public meeting (23 February 1986) in the Eastern suburbs of Melbourne to protest against any new woodchip schemes in East Gippsland. The key elements within this environmental discourse on woodchipping were: that woodchipping offered little compensation for the job losses due to regional sustained yields and new parks; that the size of pulp production (woodchipping) schemes would exert pressure for logging to be driven by pulp requirements, and pressure for the pulping of sawlogs or potential sawlogs; that increased ecological damage would result due to the intensity of logging required in pulpwood extraction; and that a greater area of forest would be given over to pulp production (in East Gippsland this meant the extensive area of forests regarded as uneconomic for logging, unless pulp extraction was carried out) (EGC 1986).

In April 1986 the influential Jobs in East Gippsland: A transitional economic strategy (Christoff and Blakers 1986) was released. Based on this study, a private briefing paper Employment implications of proposals for East Gippsland (Christoff 1986) was forwarded to members of the LCC. Both these publications were designed to support the EGC's park proposals and were released as the environmentalists' official position on the employment losses in East Gippsland. Both were structured around the claimed small job losses from park proposals, compared with; a required move to sustained yield; the total rejection of woodchipping and the claim of minimal extra jobs if it was introduced; and the advocacy of new developments and alternative employment prospects from an array of green friendly initiatives.

The timber industry responded to the LCC review by asserting:

The industry argued that if the above points were adopted there would be "...a net sustainable increase in product value output and employment in Far East Gippsland" (VSA 1985:35). The strategy of the industry, in association with the Timber Workers Union and the Pulp and Paper Federation, was to accuse the LCC of having an anti-industry pro-preservation bias and of being influenced by radical distorted conservation arguments. This campaign involved the release of publications with pro-industry versions of the "facts" and emotionally charged claims that rural communities and jobs were under threat. For example, February 1986 saw the release of Key to Survival of a Rural Community: The Forests of Far East Gippsland (VSA 1986) and A Trade Union Position: The Facts About East Gippsland (Lynch and Northover 1986). This latter booklet stated:

Another part of the industry's campaign involved the running of newspaper advertisements during March 1986 depicting a timber worker as an `endangered species'. This advertisement is reproduced here in Table 7.2. As well, the VSA organised a sustained lobbying campaign directed at Members of Parliament and Cabinet ministers (Anon 1986: per comm).

The LCC's findings and proposed recommendations on East Gippsland were released in May 1986 and were followed in June by an assessment of their economic and employment impacts by NIEIR. Later the LCC chairman David Scott, toured the region holding community consultation sessions with individuals and groups. At a public meeting in Orbost on the 17 June 1986, Scott had considerable problems in convincing the local community of the equity of the proposed recommendations. The key LCC findings and recommendations and NIEIR's impact assessment are summarised below.

The LCC recommended new National parks totalling 109 000 hectares. These recommended parks were larger than advocated by the DCFL, but did not meet the total demands of the East Gippsland Coalition who immediately proceeded to have all its park demands placed on the Register of the National Estate. This was done using standard procedure (available to individuals and organisations) to nominate any object or location for inclusion in the National Estate. The ECG's park claims were gazetted in October 1986 and awaited investigation and determination. However, their interim listing provided another Governmental and public battleground for further forest conflicts. This will be considered in the next chapter.

In its approach to the timber resource and timber production, the LCC accepted the current DCFL's resource inventory. The LCC did not comment on Ferguson's claim that with changed economic conditions 80 % of the sawlogs would be recovered from currently regarded uneconomic forests for sawlog-only logging and this would not require the introduction of pulpwood harvesting. Instead, the LCC accepted the DCFL's distinction between economic sawlog-only areas and uneconomic sawlog-only areas. On the basis of this distinction, the LCC found that in forest areas currently regarded as economic for sawlog-only production there were 6.24 million m3 of sawlogs and 12.57 million m3 of pulpwood. Conversely, in forest areas currently considered as uneconomic for sawlog-only production there were 3.67 million m3 of sawlogs and 21.28 million m3 of pulpwood (LCC 1986a:44).

However, the LCC made these resource forecasts on the basis of accepting Ferguson's starting point of current sales and not current commitments, giving a current rate of sawlog harvesting of 320 000 m3 pa. Further, the LCC accepted Ferguson's claim of 5 % more sawlogs resulting from changes in utilisation standards but said these gains would be cancelled out by sawlog resources lost in ongoing flora and fauna surveys. On the basis of its resource estimates the LCC concluded that the current rate of cutting could not be "...maintained for more than 20 years given the volume of mature sawlogs in currently economic areas (6 240 000 m3) (LCC 1986a:44). The LCC found that if this cutting rate continued, a 25 year gap would exist before regrowth was available. It also found that an immediate move to sustained yield would mean an annual harvest of some 138 000 m3 pa (LCC 1986a:44). Further it estimated that its recommended new National parks would remove 2.2 million sawlogs under current utilisation practices, about one third of its estimate of the sawlog resource. This reduced its estimate of a sustained yield from 138 000 to 98 000 m3 pa (LCC 1986a:45).

The LCC presented the sawlog resource options facing the region in graph form (reproduced here in Figure 7.4). This graph indicates another discursive realignment within the resource discourse which had by this time become a central discursive object within the `discursive formation' over the East Gippsland forests. Compared to previous resource forecasts (LLC memorandum 1978, Task Force report 1982, and the graphical forecasts of DCFL (1984) and Ferguson (1985), the LCC graph presents a different level and time frame for sawlog decline. Also, unlike the previous forecasts, the LCC graph does not contain a projection of the sawlog resource under complete sawlog-pulpwood harvesting or `woodchipping' as environmentalists called it. This central and conflictual issue had not been historically decided. What the LCC had done was to draw its picture of an existing but declining sawlog resource. Clearly, what the graph depicted was a dramatic decline in sawlogs regardless of whether the current level of cutting was continued or whether it was reduced to a sustained yield. It further showed the additional, if not as dramatic, decline in sawlogs from its proposed new parks.

On the question of pulpwood harvesting the LCC found that if introduced in all available timber production forests remaining after its new parks were accepted, the sustainable supply of sawlogs could rise from 98 000 to 220 000 m3 pa and under these conditions a sustainable supply of 750 000 m3 pa of pulpwood was possible. The LCC canvassed the environmental costs and the silvicultural and employment benefits of pulpwood production. It favoured the benefits over the costs, but recommended that pulpwood production should be legislatively defined in both area and volume terms and should be subject to an environmental effects statement.

The LCC's forecast of an additional 122 000 m3 pa of sawlogs (a 60 % increase in a sustainable yield) if pulpwood production was permitted, once again raised the critical importance of this contentious issue and its relationship to the forest employment question. While the LCC recognised the employment impacts associated with its findings, especially its recommended National parks, it did not provide estimates, deferring this task to the NIEIR impact assessment. NIEIR's evaluation of the LCC's findings and proposed recommendations was released in June 1986. In this evaluation report NIEIR isolated four basic policy options: (1) continue present levels of sawlog harvesting; (2) move over a ten year phase-down to sustained sawlog yield; (3) introduce integrated sawlog-pulpwood harvesting in areas currently regarded as economic for sawlogs-only; (4) introduce integrated sawlog-pulpwood harvesting in all areas available for timber production (NIEIR 1986:100-105).

On the basis of above policy options, NIEIR produced forecasts of employment levels against two further options central to the LCC brief: acceptance and rejection of the LCC's recommendations for new national parks. These forecasts are reproduced in Table 7.3. They show the clear employment implications of the various options facing the Government. They also highlight how important it would be for Government and they clearly show the importance of introducing pulpwood harvesting in all production forests if there was to be a sustainable industry. Without pulpwood harvesting the achievement of these two policy options would by 2011, see an industry with only 60 employees (down from 580).

The public release of both the LCC's park proposals and other findings in May 1986, followed in June 1986 by NIEIR's associated employment impact findings, marked an important point in the conflict over East Gippsland's forests. These official documents represented the end point of a series of governmental inquiries on the forests which had been undertaken by the Labor Government since its election in 1982. Starting with the Government's Task Force report on resource options in 1982, there had been an elaborate expansion in the `discursive formation' on the forests. This involved two `official discursive designs' of government, the Ferguson inquiry into the timber industry and the LCC's review of land-use. These mechanisms of government involved a vast accumulation of `knowledge' out of which this problematic of government could be rendered `rational' and made programmable. From this body of knowledge and still within the ongoing force of opposing positions the government would issue its `official state discourse' containing its program for the forests.

In the next chapter I will examine how the Victorian Labor Government in its `official discourse' dealt with the issues now before it. I will also examine the continuance of conflict over the forests, which was to establish itself as a national forest problem where the issues of export woodchipping, forest preservation and forest employment would be central.

This chapter has traced the evolution of the East Gippsland forest problem from the election of the Cain Labor Government in April 1982, up until mid-1986, when its extensive forest inquiries were completed. What is outstanding in characterising this period is the intensity of public inquiry on the forest problematic. Also of note is that during this period of governmental inquiry, with the exception of new procedures affecting the planning of logging, there was no change to the fundamentals of wood extraction in East Gippsland. The embedded material structures of unsustainability discussed in the previous two chapters, continued under the new Government. The events of inquiry did see these fundamentals and their implications for forest employment transformed into central discursive objects in an expanded conflictual `discursive formation' over the forests.

Having made commitments to the environment movement and their supporters while in opposition, the Cain Government needed to act on the forest problem. It took some early but ad hoc responses and was soon faced with new and massive National park claims by the ACF in October 1982. The Government's long-term strategy was to rely on new bureaucratic advice and a series of official discursive designs involving extensive public consultation to investigate the forest problems and assess the competing claims.

The Government's first major piece of advice was the early report on timber resource estimates and production options prepared by foresters within the Forest Commission and publically released. These foresters operated with what Foucault calls `licit and immediate access' to a body of still privileged data. This enabled an exercise of power based on selectively developing state-wide resource and option profiles comparing full sawlog-pulpwood harvesting with the situation if environmental claims were accepted (no new pulpwood schemes, new National parks and extended logging rotations). It did not show regional resource situations and thus did not show the effects of regional unsustainability. No public statements were made concerning the 40 m3 sawlog-only operating convention and the effect it had on the estimation of sawlog availability if the Government introduced new parks and failed to approve pulpwood harvesting. It required formal public inquiries to reveal the material nature and extent of unsustainability and the associated impact on employment in the East Gippsland timber industry.

During 1983, Australian environmental politics was dominated by the direct blockade on the Franklin River in Tasmania. In the wake of this action, environmentalists threatened direct forest action in East Gippsland. This provoked the Government into announcing the simultaneous moritorium of the Rodger River and the establishment of the Ferguson Timber Industry Inquiry in December 1983. These actions failed to prevent direct action. In January 1984, environmental activists established the Errinundra logging blockade, focussing public attention on East Gippsland and also generated counter-movement action within timber communities.

At the time Ferguson started his public inquiry (mid-1984), rival forces had mobilised around the objects (woodchipping and National parks) which during the 1970s constitued the conflictual `discursive formation' over the forests. The Government added to this `discursive formation' the question of sustainability with its policy commitment to introduce regional sustainable yields with minimum possible disruption to forest employment. From this point `sustainability' of wood production and a `resource estimates' discourse would enter and became pivotal within the existing `discursive formation' over the East Gippsland forests.

The first critical contribution to this `resource estimates' discourse was produced by government foresters in a public submission to the Ferguson Inquiry. This submission was a discursive event in providing, for the first time, a regional resource profile for East Gippsland. This profile in graph form showed resource levels and declines under each of the contentious objects making up the discursive formation: woodchipping, National parks and sustained yields. It also correlated the policy choices against their employment impacts. This brought the forest empoyment question directly into the `discursive formation'. Still, Government foresters made no mention of the underlying 40 m3 sawlog-only convention and its impact. The shape of its East Gippsland resource option graphs became the basis and object of subsequent discourses (with graphs and associated tables) dealing with wood production sustainability and forest employment. This was an important exercise of power, again involving `licit and immediate access' to privileged data.

The first significant discursive change within this crucial `resource estimation' discourse came with Ferguson's public mention and questioning of the economic assumption underlying the 40 m3 sawlog convention. Ferguson said that 80 % of the sawlogs in so-called uneconomic forests could be harvested with or without pulpwood removal and that with better utilisation standards in sawmills, additional sawlogs could be recovered. On the pulpwood question Ferguson was to say that the minimal ecological impacts of pulpwood harvesting were outweighed by the considerable socio-economic impacts. Ferguson said that pulpwood harvesting, subject to an EES, was the only realistic option if the East Gippsland timber industry was to survive.

Ferguson's report was released in mid-1985. It provided the Government with the basis of inquiry that it said would inform its production of a Timber Industry Strategy. At this time the Government also launched a second LCC review of East Gippsland. This discursive design would provide the Government with a land-use determination to accompany its new industry strategy.

The LCC review crystalised and expanded the discursive struggle over East Gippsland. Throughout its discursive inquiries the major forces produced conflicting discourses on the forest land-use. The major discourses deployed were firstly derived from the `discursive formation' on the forests that had been constituted in the campaigns and government inquiries of the 1970s. Added to these were rival discursive positions on resource levels and their impacts on sustainable yields and employment.

During this period of governmental inquiry the discourses deployed on woodchipping and National parks retained their discursive articulation across the events in this forest conflict. Adding to this was the discursive transformation of the central elements of the non-discursive (material) formation of wood extraction, into a critical discursive object. This related to the fundamental unsustainability of the industry and hence of forest employment. With the LCC's assessment of all these discursive objects (woodchipping, National parks, sustainability and forest employment) one can see in the LCC's statistical computation, what is a complex set of `relational dependencies'. Change in any one of these elements in the material sense effects the prospects of the other elements: this is the sense of effect in Foucault's understanding of power (the effect of one action on another action).

The LCC had left the Government with an immense `problematic', for to deliver its environmental commitments (new National parks and a sustainable industry) without introducing woodchipping, would mean massive job losses. Further, neither the industry nor the environment movement was pleased with the LCC's recommendations and intensified their public mobilisations. They would continue their struggle over the forests. Woodchipping remained undecided and environmentalists nominated their still undecided National parks (those parts the LCC rejected) for National Estate listing and so strategically set-up possible Commonwealth Government involvement in East Gippsland. As well, official inquiries had found wood extraction to be unsustainable with major employment consequences.

By mid 1986, the Labor Government had the basis of its official discursive inquiries into the forest problem completed. It would now face the task of translating this body of `knowledge' and the opposing positions into an `official state discourse' on the forests. This and the continuing forest conflict are the subject of the next chapter.